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Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice
John K. Setear*
The basic question asked in this paper can be simply stated. Assume that,
in attempting to effect international legal cooperation, a national government
consciously chooses between using treaties and using customary law as the form
in which to embody its cooperative efforts. Which form of international law
should we expect it to choose?
I analyze this question using two approaches that may be termed "rational
choice" methodologies since they assume that the relevant decisionmakers
rationally pursue known goals.' The first approach, which I call the "iterative
perspective," focuses on the efforts of a rational, public-minded government to
minimize the transaction costs of international cooperation.2 The iterative
perspective implies that nation-states will choose to effect international legal
cooperation through treaties.3 The second approach, which I call the "public
Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am indebted to the American Society
of International Law for providing a forum at its annual meeting at which to present an early
version of these ideas. See John K. Setear, Explaining the Sources and Methods of InternationalLaw:
Treaties, Custom, Rational Choice, and Public Choice, 94 Am Socy Intl L Proc 187 (2000). I was able
to present a version of this paper at a Conference on Rational Choice and International Law
through the generosity of the conference's sponsor (the University of Chicago Law School) and
its organizers (Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner). Rachel Setear and Paul Stephan provided
helpful comments on an earlier draft, as did the students in a Colloquium on International
Relations Theory held at the University of Virginia. Kent Olson's ever-ready reference skills
kept me from barking up the wrong tree.
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I dedicate this piece to Harland Bloland, for his rare ability always both to read it and to get it.
For a discussion of rational choice methodologies in international law and international
relations, as well as some competing approaches in those fields, see John K. Setear, Responses to
Breach of a Treaty and RationalistInternationalRelations Theory: The Rules of Rekase and Remediation in
the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 Va L Rev 1, 2-6 (1997).
John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of InternationalRelations Theog and
InternationalLaw,37 Harv Ind LJ 139, 174 (1996).
For works exploring the iterative nature of treaties, see id; John K. Setear, Law in the Serice of
Politics: Moving Neo-L.iberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theogy by Using the International Treaov
Process to Define 'iteration", 37 Va J Intl L 641 (1997); John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and
InternationalLaw,40 VaJ Intl L 193 (1999).
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choice" approach, 4 examines the choices of self-interested governmental
subunits.' The public choice perspective predicts that national leaders will
choose customary international law to effect international legal cooperation.
With these divergent theoretical predictions in mind, I move to reality and argue
that treaties rather than customary laws have been the favored embodiment of
international legal cooperation, at least since World War II. I conclude that the
evidence is thus more consistent with the iterative perspective than with the
public choice approach.
I. TREATIES, CUSTOM, AND THE ITERATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A. TREATIES AND THE ITERATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Treaty and custom are generally identified as the most prominent sources
of international law.6 In previous work, 7 I have argued that the law of treatiesthe set of general procedural rules governing the degree of obligation imposed
upon nations by the text of any particular treaty 8 is consistent with an
institutional design aimed at promoting a formally delineated series of structured
interactions among parties ("iterations"), and that such an institutional design
fosters cooperative behavior against the backdrop of the Prisoner's Dilemma
typically thought to confront nation-states considering international political
cooperation. 9 In a complex world offering broad gains from cooperation but
significant incentives to cheat, nations should structure their interactions to
facilitate gradual cooperation over a number of clearly defined iterations,
delineating what behavior constitutes cooperation at each interval.
The law of treaties specifies a set of rules for the promulgation of
international agreements that results in a highly structured and iterative process

6

7
8

For an accessible introduction to public choice theory by one of its seminal theorists, see James
M. Buchanan, Public Choice: Politics Without Romance, 19 Poly 13 (2003), available online at:
<http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/spr03/polsprO3-2.pdf> (visited Nov 22, 2004).
Paul B. Stephan, BarbariansInside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and InternationalEconomic Law,
10
Am U J Ind L & Poly 745, 746 (1995). For other works applying public choice theory in the
context of intemational legal issues, see Paul B. Stephan, Accountabiify and International
Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimagy, 17 NwJ Intl L & Bus 681 (1996); Paul B. Stephan, Courts,
Tribunals, and Legal Unifiation-The Ageny Problem, 3 Chi J Intl L 333 (2002).
See Ian Brownlie, Princdplesof Public InternationalLaw 5 (Oxford 6th ed 2003) (stating that treaties
and custom "are obviously the important sources").
See notes 2 and 3.
Setear, 37 Harv Intl L J at 147-55 (cited in note 2) (describing the law of treaties). See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UNTS 331 (1980) (codifying the law of
treaties).
See Setear, 37 Harv Intl L J at 174-211 (cited in note 2); Setear, 37 Va J Intl L at 654-721 (cited
in note 3); Setear, 40 VaJ Ind L at 198-206 (cited in note 3).
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with three distinct phases. First, potential parties to a treaty, guided by a
relatively vague duty to act in good faith, meet in formalized international
negotiations.
Second, after these negotiations conclude, representatives from the
participating nations decide either to reject the resulting text or to adopt it
through an affirmative vote or signature.1 ° Adoption here functions differently
from signature in the typical domestic contract, particularly because of its
inability to upgrade a negotiated text into a fully binding legal instrument.'
Adopting nations must usually only refrain from actions that would undermine
the object or purpose of the preliminary text.
The third phase of the treaty process begins when a treaty enters into
force, an event ordinarily occurring within a given time after a specified number
of nations have gone beyond mere adoption to indicate formally their complete
consent to the treaty. Both the threshold number of fully consenting nationswho "ratify" the treaty (if they have previously adopted its text) or "accede to"
the treaty (if they have not)12-and the requisite interval between the triggering
ratification and the initial entry into force are typically elucidated by the relevant
treaty. In contrast to the limited obligations flowing from adoption, a party that
has ratified a treaty in force is bound to comply fully with all of that treaty's
terms. 3 Any preconditions attaching to the head of state's ratification or
accession fall within the ambit of domestic law; frequently, the executive branch
4
must exclusively obtain legislative consent before ratification.'
The law of treaties thus involves three distinct iterations-negotiation,
signature, and entry into force-which impose corresponding obligations upon
participants to negotiate in good faith, to avoid actions that defeat the treaty's
object or purpose, and to comply in good faith with all treaty terms.
10

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 10 (cited in note 8) (establishing procedures for

12

the authentication of treaty text).
"The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other
means if so agreed." Id, art 11. However, the signature of a representative serves as consent to
be bound only when
"(a) [t]he treaty provides that signature shall have that effect; (b) It is otherwise
established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature should have
that effect; or (c) The intention of the State to give that effect to the signature
appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the
negotiation." Id, art 12(1).
See id, arts 14-15 (distinguishing ratification from accession).

13

Compare id, art 18 (signing state obliged only to refrain from defeating object and purpose of

14

treaty) with id, art 26 ("treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith').
See Section II.A.

11
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Furthermore, treaty law defines temporal periods with some clarity.
Negotiations convene at a particular time and conclude when representatives
adopt the treaty text, an act that generally transpires at a discrete moment. The
third iteration in the treaty process-entry into force-occurs on a date
mentioned in the treaty. The treaty text may also suggest a period for subsequent
iterations, as when it specifies that the parties shall decide to renew the treaty
after a given interval or allow it to lapse, or when the treaty states that the parties
shall regularly meet to evaluate the efficacy of their agreement.'" The clarity of
the relevant behaviors and of their accompanying temporal boundaries enable
the treaty process to serve as an especially suitable, practical backdrop for the
pursuit of international cooperation and an apt object of academic study. 6
Finally, it bears noting that the typical treaty is in writing and often
contains voluminous, highly detailed substantive regulations, as well as rules
specifying the temporal boundaries of each stage of consent and the particular
form of that consent.'" This situation differs markedly from that characterizing
customary international law.
B. CUSTOM AND THE ITERATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Unlike treaty law, customary international law fails to create a series of
temporally distinct, highly structured interactions among nations. 8 Article
38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that the
International Court of Justice shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law."' 9 The second clause of this phrase sets forth

15

See Setear, 37 Harv Intl

16

which repeated iterations of negotiations yielded repeated treaty modifications reflecting greater
and greater international cooperation, see Setear, 40 Va J Intl L at 206-82 (cited in note 3).
See Setear, 37 Va Intl L at 666-75, 721-24 (cited in note 3); Setear, 40 Va J Intl L at 283-99

17

(cited in note 3) (using ozone treaties to test comparative predictive power of two prominent
schools of international relations).
For a discussion of an area of international cooperation that has undergone a number of

J at 212-27 (cited in note 2). For a description of a set of treaties in

wholesale revisions while retaining well-specified and detailed regulations throughout, see John

19

K. Setear, Can Legalization Last?: Whaling and the Durabiliyof National (Execuive) Discretion, 44 VaJ
IntlL 711 (2004).
For a rational choice perspective on customary law that does not especially emphasize the
contrast between treaty law and customary law, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A
Theory of Customay InternationalLaw, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113, 1172 (1999). For criticisms of
customary international law that raise points similar to those raised here, though not through
the theoretical lens of the iterative perspective, see Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customagy InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L Rev 665 (1986); Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary
Law, 81 Am J Intl L 101 (1987) (discussing dilemmas courts face in applying customary
international law).
Statute of the International Court ofJustice (1945), art 38(l)(b), 50 Stat 1055, 1060.
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the two elements of customary international legal rules: a behavioral element
involving the widespread observance of a given behavior by a large number of
nation-states, and a psychological element involving a self-conscious belief that
adherence to the relevant behavior is a matter of international legal obligation
rather than entirely a matter of legally unconstrained choice.2"
From the iterative perspective, three difficulties distinguish customary
international law from laws originating in treaty texts. First, customary
international law involves iterations with fluid temporal limits. Second, problems
arise in determining whether a nation has consented to a rule of customary
international law. Third, articulating the substantive customary rule itself, and
accordingly evaluating whether a nation's actual behavior constitutes
cooperation with (or defection from) the relevant attempt at international
political cooperation, is difficult.
Rules of customary international law lack the lucid temporal boundaries
characterizing rules of treaty law. Customary international law features a
temporal dimension in requiring that a given practice persist in time21 (and
across a significant segment of the international community) 22 before it becomes
elevated to a binding legal rule. However, customary international law manifests
no structure within the requisite period of persistent practice, often imposing
duties that nations must continually discharge. Examples of customary
international legal norms include abstention from the use of force, respect for
the diplomatic immunity of accredited representatives and embassy property of
foreign nations, and noninterference with freedom of navigation on the high
seas. 23 Such situations suggest no natural temporal bounds for iterations. Treaty
20

Goldsmith and Posner, 66 U Chi L Rev at 1116-17 (cited in note 18). The psychological

21

element, more familiarly known as opinio juris, suggests some logical difficulties, such as
circularity and the need to impute "intentions" to a nation-state, but these are not directly
pertinent to the comparison undertaken here.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 694 (1900) ("[Al hundred years ... is amply sufficient to

22

have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to
grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international law.");
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 5 102 cmt c (1987) ("A
practice initially followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states
generally come to believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. It is often
difficult to determine when that transformation into law has taken place.").
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102 cmt b (cited in note 21) ("Where is no

23

precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should reflect wide
acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity. Failure of a significant
number of important states to adopt a practice can prevent a principle from becoming general
customary law though it might become 'particular customary law' for the participating states.").
See Military and ParamitagyActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar v US), 1984 ICJ 392, 424
(Nov 26, 1984) ("Principles such as ...respect for the independence and territorial integrity of
States, and the freedom of navigation, continue to be binding as part of customary international
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law, in contrast, does involve distinct phases-namely negotiation, adoption, and
entry into force-and thus at least formally possesses an iterative quality
uncharacteristic of the customary international legal process.
The mechanisms for assessing whether a nation has consented to a rule of
customary international law also lack the clarity of mechanisms imposed by the
law of treaties upon potential adherents to a particular treaty. A nation, it is true,
can unambiguously consent to a rule of customary international law by
undertaking affirmative actions, supplemented by explicit official statements that
legal compulsion drives its actions. Conversely, a nation can clearly signal its
opposition to a customary international rule by persistently defying the rule and
releasing explicit official statements indicating that its behavior is intended to
express disagreement with the rule.
However, a number of intermediate cases, which occur with some
frequency, undermine the clarity of consent. Some problems arise from the
continuous nature of rules of restraint. Even a proposed rule as apparently
quixotic as "refrain from warfare" accurately describes the practice of a majority
of nations at most times. While several wars may be in progress around the
world at any particular moment, rules are judged on a national, not global, basis,
and most nations-save perhaps Vietnam-have been at peace for the vast
majority of years since their foundings, even during the violent twentieth
century. This observation raises the issue of whether nations that never explicitly
intend to protest the development of a rule banning warfare, but occasionally
undertake wars, still adhere to peace as a "practice." Must a nation that desires to
signal its consent to a "rule of peace" issue daily bulletins proclaiming that its
behavior for that day rests upon its opiniojuiswith respect to that rule?
The ambiguity of silence in the mixed system of practical and psychological
consent that constitutes customary international law further hinders international
cooperation. Consent to a treaty requires a government formally and
affirmatively state its intention to comply with treaty obligations in part (by
adoption) or in full (by ratification or accession). However, customary
international law allows a nation's consent to be inferred. When a nation fails to
object to an international practice that is accompanied by opiniojuris on the part
of other nations, that nation may be bound to the resulting rule of customary
law.24 This principle holds true even when the nation lacks an opportunity to

24

law, despite the operation of provisions of conventional law in which they have been
incorporated.").
See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in Ronald St.
J.
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston, eds, The Structure and Process of InternationalLaw: Essays in
Legal Pbilosopy Doctrine and Theory 513, 549 (Martinus Nijhoff 1983) (States "can advance a new
rule of general international law, either in concert with other states or unilaterally, simply by
evincing a new opinio individualis juris generas .... If other states do not object, and in fact
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announce its views on the given rules. One relatively dramatic example involves
a new nation-state, which must typically consent to the entire body of customary
international law before entering the international legal realm.2"
Customary international law thus suffers from a lack of temporally distinct
iterations and from ambiguous mechanisms for indicating formal consent. The
final criterion with special relevance to the iterative perspective considers the
clarity of the substantive rule itself. A lucid, specific rule eases the process of
determining whether a nation is cooperating with the international political
endeavor at hand. Customary international law also evinces shortcomings on this
count.
Because practice figures so prominently in defining customary rules, any
change in such rules can only be effectuated after a period during which neither
the old nor the new rule clearly governs. While a new rule articulated in a treaty
takes full effect when the treaty enters into force, a new customary international
legal rule has no discrete activation date. The new rule of customary
international law accretes from the scattered choices of innovative nation-states
who "legislate by doing," gradually shedding their previous practice for the
newer one. The innovator rarely generates an instantaneous, universal rush to
the new practice; some nations affirmatively resist the implicit suggestion to alter
their practices, while others continue their previous silence on the matter. The
innovator is accordingly likely to be a violator for some interval, a situation that
can perplex other nations pondering an appropriate response. Furthermore, a
claim of innovation only becomes distinguishable from an unalloyed violation in
retrospect, after one knows whether the "proposed" customary international
rule has been widely adopted, and thereby accepted by other nations. This
incongruity exacerbates the difficulty of determining a proper response to the
innovator's (or violator's) deviation from the accepted norm of cooperation. If
the British Empire decides to employ the Royal Navy to interdict the slave trade

25

follow suit [ ], a new opinio generalis juris generalis may grow up, thus bringing about a new
rule of general international law.").
See L. Oppenheim, InternalionalLaw§ 27 at 31 (Longmans, Green 1st ed 1905) (One of "three
conditions for the admission of new members into the circle of the Family of Nations" is that a
"[s]tate must.., expressly or tacitly consent to be bound for its future international conduct by
the rules of International Law."). This passage is reprinted through H. Lauterpacht, ed,
InternationalLaw 44 (Longmans, Green 5th ed 1937) but has been omitted from more recent
editions. A more modern perspective is found in Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State
Practice at 517-18 (cited at note 24) ("An important reason why the existing members of
international society wish to retain this right of admission to the international legal order is that
they must be given an opportunity of assessing whether the aspiring entity is able and willing to
abide by the rules of that legal order .. . . [I]nsofar as such an entity is anxious to join the
system, it will normally be found that, instead of flaunting its freedom from the restraints of the
rules of the system, it will do its best to show how much it is able and willing to abide by
them.").
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at a time when such trade has long occurred and when such interdiction in
international waters plainly violates the existing understanding of the freedom of
the high seas, then one may plausibly characterize the Empire as a flagrant
violator of existing custom or a laudable innovator (or both). One cannot be
sure for some time whether the innovation will draw enough adherents to
constitute a new norm of customary international law.
The unwritten, retrospective nature of customary international law also
contributes to the difficulty of judging whether a nation's behavior demonstrates
compliance with its obligations under such law. While treaties-agreements
ordinarily penned before enactment-are prospectively oriented exercises,
customary law derives its norms from the retrospection of observed behavior.
To the extent that the prospective, written specification of rules enhances their
clarity, compliance with a cooperative norm set forth in treaty law should be
easier to determine than compliance with a cooperative norm of customary
international law.
C. COMPARING TREATY TO CUSTOM, FROM THE ITERATIVE

PERSPECTIVE

When comparing the two principal instruments of international law, treaty
and custom, one may reasonably conclude that an iterative process more firmly
undergirds the former. Treaty law features iterations with relatively distinct
temporal boundaries; possesses clear, formal mechanisms for evaluating whether
a nation has consented to certain rules; and boasts a prospective, written format,
specifying rules that can serve as touchstones against which to assess the actual
behavior of consenting nations. Given that treaties offer this myriad of
advantages over custom from the iterative perspective, the executive26 should
utilize treaties as the preferred international instrument of cooperation.
II.

TREATIES, CUSTOM, AND PUBLIC CHOICE

The iterative perspective is not the only angle from which to examine an
executive's choice of international instrument. An alternative point of viewpublic choice theory-shares a fundamental assumption of actor rationality with
the iterative perspective, but public choice theorists embrace a more atomistic
view of governments and draw less benign conclusions about the outcome of
the relevant process. Public choice theorists argue that groups of actors within
government endeavor to maximize their own influence at the expense of other

26

This argument assumes a rational executive acting in the public interest.
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groups, both within and without government.27 Bureaucrats, for example, may
seek to maximize the budget or influence of their agency, or strive to obtain a
lucrative postgovernmental job. Legislators may cater to special interests instead
of attempting to convince the median voter that they deserve reelection.2 8
A public choice analysis of the chief executive's decision to select a given
international instrument preliminarily requires that general, theoretical
descriptions of political actors be particularized. This Article focuses on the US
President. The chief executive likely considers the general welfare of the public
as one of a set of interests that also includes reelection, fundraising, and
postadministration job prospects or speaking fees. When these personal and
public interests diverge, the chief executive will sometimes favor the former.
Furthermore, one can assume that the chief executive best advances personal
interests when equipped with maximum decision-making autonomy; a
recalcitrant Congress and vast, unresponsive bureaucracies can readily thwart
presidential initiatives in the United States.2 9 From a public choice perspective,
an actor with market power (in this case, the president) would seek maximum
freedom to set the relevant price (here, a bargain with concentrated political
interests) without needing to solicit approval from others (notably outside
Congress or the judiciary). A chief executive seeking such freedom of action may
be described as an "influence-maximizer."
The type of instrument used in affirmatively binding the US to new
international obligations significantly informs the degree of presidential

28

For an early work in international relations that includes a discussion of the influencemaximizing perspective adopted here, see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis 28-33 (Little, Brown 1971).
See generally Note, The Ass atop the Castle: Competing Strategies for Using
Campaign Donations to
Influence Lawmaking, 116 Harv L Rev 2610, 2615 n 24 (2003) (citing nine articles that report
statistically significant links between contributions and legislative behavior, as well as seven
articles reaching the opposite conclusion and finding little or no link between interest group
contributions and legislators' votes).

29

Beguiled by their conviction that dispassionate analysis could trump the
reigning orthodoxy, the Clinton appointees were unprepared for the rearguard
action waged by career officers and bureaucrats in the Defense Department.
.. . Senior officers, aided by civilian counterparts and conservatives in the
Congress, stymied any momentum towards innovation and, when no highlevel officials took the time to defend the process, the [1993 Nuclear Posture
Review] reached conclusions which did little to alter Cold War precepts.
James R. Holmes and Janne E. Nolan, Render unto Caesar Bureaucray and Nonproliferationafter the
Iraq War?, 28 Fletcher F World Aff 73, 84-85 (2004); Richard R. Beeman, UnlimitedDebate in the
Senate: The First Phase, 83 Pol Sci Q 419, 424 (1968) ("At the beginning of his administration
[John Quincy] Adams had proposed an ambitious legislative program; Congress had no
intention of letting the President dictate what legislation was necessary, and, accordingly, had
ignored every one of his major recommendations.") (footnote omitted).
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influence. The president usually wields considerable control over policy
instruments that set US positions on customary international law, but ordinarily
shares control with the legislature when using treaty law to encapsulate official
policy. Furthermore, courts more readily defer to executive assertions of
3
customary law than to executive interpretations of treaty provisions. " On
balance, then, an influence-maximizing president should choose customary law
over treaty law.

30

The Supreme Court, in interpreting the customary international legal rules of property
expropriation and the "act of state" doctrine that has developed through the custom of US
courts interpreting the actions of foreign governments, has stated:
[S]erious and far-reaching consequences would flow from a judicial finding
that international law standards had been met if that determination flew in the
face of a State Department proclamation to the contrary. When articulating
principles of international law in its relations with other states, the Executive
Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes
desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns.
Banco Nadonalde Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398, 432-33 (1963).
Curtis Bradley argues in favor of this additional deference:
[T]here are good policy reasons for judicial deference to the executive branch.
Customary international law is very fluid and amorphous, making the
executive branch's expertise and access to information especially important. In
addition, the formation and evolution of customary international law can be
influenced by executive branch statements and actions. Indeed, the ability of
the United States to influence a change in customary international law may
depend on executive branch flexibility in interpreting the requirements of this
law.
Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and ForeignAffairs, 86 Va L Rev 649, 708-09 (2000).
For instances in which the Supreme Court, by way of contrast, rejected the executive branch's
interpretation of treaties, see David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive
Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U Pa L Rev 1353, 1397-98 n 187 (1989) (listing
cases).
One should be well aware, however, that courts give the executive a good deal of deference in
the interpretation of any international law, including treaties and even relevant statutes. See
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc v Avagliano, 457 US 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive,
the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight."); David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons
and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L Rev 953, 954 (1994) ("Treaty interpretation is bankrupt
because of unbridled deference" to the wishes of the executive branch.); Martin A. Rogoff,
Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of International Treaty
Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 Am U J Intl L &
Poly 559, 583 (1996) ("[T]he Court shows such great deference to executive interpretation of
both statute and treaty, that effective judicial review is all but illusory.').
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A. TREATIES, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE EXECUTIVE AS
INFLUENCE-MAXIMIZER

Article II of the US Constitution enumerates presidential powers and
contains the "Treaty Clause," which establishes that "[The President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur ....,,31Treaty law thus
requires legislative participation, and the Treaty Clause's supermajority provision
accords increased importance to the Senate's views relative to the case of
ordinary legislation, which becomes law with only majority approval from each
house.
The US president has sought the Senate's advice and consent on a wide
array of international agreements. In fact, international accords concerned with
national security (such as the North Atlantic Treaty or nearly all arms control
treaties)3 2 and the environment (such as the Montreal Protocol or the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling) have almost exclusively
traveled the Article II preratification pathway.3 3 The Senate's likely or apparent
refusal to render advice and consent has not deterred the president from
referring such agreements to the senior chamber. Presidents have, for example,
gamely forwarded human rights agreements to the Senate despite that chamber's
repeated refusal to act on such accords.34 Presidents have also paid for their
31

32
33
34

US Const, art II,

§ 2, cl2.
See John K. Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a Treay's Preraificaion Pathway: Arile II,
Congressional-ExecuiveAgreement, or Executive Agreement, 31 J Legal Stud S5, S26-27 (2002).
See id at S32.
Sarah Cleveland provides a variety of examples:
The Senate may refuse to consent to international agreements that the
President has negotiated and signed, as in the infamous case of the Versailles
Treaty. This tension has manifested itself more recently with the Senate's
refusal to ratify many human rights treaties. The Genocide Convention, for
example, was signed and introduced to the Senate by President Truman in
1949. The treaty languished for nearly four decades, despite renewed requests
for ratification by the Nixon and Carter Administrations, before the Senate
finally gave its consent in 1988. The Senate similarly declined to ratify
conventions relating to forced labor and women's rights that were introduced
by the Kennedy Administration. The Torture Convention, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Race Discrimination
Convention were all introduced to the Senate by the Carter Administration,
but Senate consent to these instruments was not forthcoming until the 1990s.
The Senate has rendered the United States anomalous in the world community
by continuing to withhold consent to the Convention to Eliminate All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. The Senate also has declined to consent to the American Convention
on Human Rights.
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One-Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 Vill L Rev 975,
985-86 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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decisions to employ the Article II process on national security matters such as
the Treaty of Versailles and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, both of which
the Senate defeated.35 In the field of maritime law, President Clinton submitted
the Law of the Sea Convention to the Senate during his first term, and the
proposal has remained dormant since."
The president has also sometimes bypassed the Treaty Clause.37 In some
instances, Congress has granted the president advance authority to negotiate a
treaty, with ratification contingent on the majority vote of both legislative
houses-a procedure akin to that used to pass ordinary legislation. A textualist
would note that such agreements almost invariably involve tariffs or taxes, and
that Article I, Section 7 of the US Constitution states: "All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.",38 However, some
recent agreements circumventing the Article II process have dealt with nontariff
barriers to trade. Textualists seeking support for this newer subject matter would
presumably invoke Article I, Section 8, which establishes that "[The Congress
shall have power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations., 39 Given these
constitutional provisions, federal courts hearing challenges to the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") have not invalidated the bicameral
majority vote pathway to ratification. Although this procedure utilizes a different
power-sharing structure from the Treaty Clause, it retains the principle of shared
power between the executive and legislature branches.
The bicameral majority vote procedure, of which "fast-track" trade treaties
comprise a subset, reflects a highly intricate power-sharing arrangement. In the
fast-track schema, Congress first lays broad contours for a future agreement's
subject matter. Several of its members then officially join the US delegation
negotiating the agreement. At some later, fixed time, the president gives
Congress notice of his intention to sign the agreement, and within a certain
period after doing so, presents to both houses a statute incorporating the treaty's
text. Congress caps this process by voting on the statute, which it may not
amend. With their drafters presumably conscious of the Constitution's "advice

35

36

37

Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: 1917-1921 at 156-59 (Harper & Row 1985)
(Treaty of Versailles); Angelique R. Kuchta, Comment, A Closer Look: The U.S. Senate's Failure to
Ralift the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 19 Dickinson J Intl L 333 (2001) (Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty).
Setear, 31 J Legal Stud at S6 (cited in note 32).

38

For a rational choice analysis of the President's choice of a treaty's preratification pathway, see
id.
US Const, art I, 7, cl1.

39

US Const, art I,

8, cl3.
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and consent" provision and international law's reference to "ratification" by the
head of state, fast-track agreements specify that the Congress "approves" the
agreement in question, and that the president may "accept" the agreement once
it enters into force in the international realm.4" Such statutes, like those
accompanying the World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreement, 4 are styled
as implementing legislation, with provisions declaring the agreement null and
void when its terms contravene US law.42
The need for legislative consent from either a unicameral supermajority or
a bicameral majority places a significant formal restraint on the president's
discretion. The bicameral majority vote process even mandates that the
president receive statutory authorization from Congress before proceeding with
treaty negotiations. If all treaties required resort to one of these preratification
pathways, an influence-maximizing president would understandably select
customary international law as the superior instrument for effecting international
policy; as I argue in the next Section, the legislative constraints on the president's
use of customary law are minimal.
Sometimes, however, the president ratifies an international agreement, or
treats it as binding, without consulting either house of Congress. Emergency
situations-notably wars-foster such accords. For example, before official US
belligerency in World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt independently made a
bases-for-destroyers bargain under which Britain received fifty nearly obsolete
American destroyers and US forces occupied and administered British bases.43
The president also routinely enters into bilateral investment treaties ("BITs")
without eliciting congressional support." An influence-maximizing executive
would prefer forming such agreements, which impose no apparent constraint on
his freedom of action, as opposed to those requiring legislative consent.
40

41

42

4

See Michael A. Carrier, AllAboard the CongressionalFastTrack: From Trade to Beyond, 29 Geo Wash
J Intl L & Econ 687 (1996).
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act
Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Apr 15, 1994), 1867 UNTS 3
(1995).
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1994), § 102(a)(1), Pub L No
103-465, 108 Stat 4809, 4815
(codified at 19 USC § 3512(a)(1) (2000)) ("No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect."). See also William R. Sprance,
The World Trade Organization and United States' Sovereigny: The Politicaland ProceduralRealities of the
System, 13 Am U Intl L Rev 1225 (1998).
See Aaron Xavier Feilmeth, A Divorce Waiting to Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the Law of
Neutrality, 1935-1941, 3 Buff J Ind L 413, 467-80 (1996-97); Quincy Wright, The Tranfer of
Destroyers to Great Britain, 34 Am J Intl L 680 (1940); Herbert W. Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the
DestroyerDeal, 34 Am J Intl L 569 (1940).
See Setear, 31 J Legal Stud at S25 (cited in note 32).
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Furthermore, federal courts have typically recognized the president's power to
enter into important agreements without Congress' participation, even when
such agreements ostensibly also encroached into the courts' domain and directly
affected ongoing litigation. In United States v Pink,45 the Supreme Court upheld
the termination of claims in connection with the Litinov Agreement recognizing
the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the president never submitted the
Agreement to either chamber of the Congress. In Dames & Moore v Regan,46 the
Court upheld an executive agreement-formed without congressional inputthat terminated ongoing claims against Iran in exchange for the release of US
hostages. These cases narrowly apply only to executive agreements resolving
claims against foreign governments, but they nonetheless demonstrate the
Supreme Court's deference to executive agreements reached without Congress'
support-even those interfering with the courts' jurisdiction.
However, treaty law in general significantly constrains the president's
ability to commit the United States to a particular endeavor of international
cooperation. The Constitution stipulates that the president must obtain support
from a two-thirds majority of the Senate before ratifying a treaty. 47 The president
actually possesses greater discretion than might be inferred from the
Constitution, but he still frequently refers treaties to Congress and sometimes
suffers resounding defeats at its hands.
B. CUSTOMARY LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
EXECUTIVE AS INFLUENCE-MAXIMIZER
Because the executive controls most levers of national practice relevant to
the establishment of customary international law, but shares power with
Congress in making treaty law, an influence-maximizing president should favor
customary international law as an instrument of policy.
At a cursory glance, the US Constitution appears to give the Congress
primacy in the formulation of all manifestations of national policy at and outside
US borders. Article I of the Constitution vests Congress with the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, 48 establish rules of naturalization,49 and
define and punish high-seas piracy or any other offense against "the Law of
Nations. ' Congress, rather than the president, has authority to declare war,

46

315 US 203, 229 (1942).
453 US 654, 679 (1981).

47

US Const, art II,

48
49

US Const, art I,
US Const, art I,

50

US

45

§ 2,

§ 8,
§ 8,
Const, art I, § 8,

c 2.
c 3.
c 4.
cl10.
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grant letters of marque, and define reprisal."1 Congress is clearly the patron of
the armed forces, with the power to "raise and support Armies" 2 and to
"provide and maintain a Navy."53 It also possesses the power to "make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."54 The executive
of course serves as commander in chief.5 In addition, only the president can,
subject to the Senate's advice and consent, "make" treaties," and, subject to a
simple majority vote of the Senate, appoint "Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls. ' 5 7 The president also "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers." 8
If the Constitution's framers conferred this preponderance of formal
regulatory powers upon Congress in order to give the national legislature an
enduring primary role in the conduct of foreign policy, however, their
expectation has not achieved fruition. Congress retains some influence on
foreign policy through the powers of textual specification (chiefly statutory
authorizations), including control of appropriations. But the day-to-day
administrative responsibilities entrusted to the executive have, over the
centuries, effectively given the president primacy in the formulation and conduct
of foreign policy.
Such primacy is especially pronounced in the formulation of customary
international law. The instruments most relevant to this process are a nation's
diplomatic corps and its armed forces, both of which are readily controlled by
the president. The most prominent objects of customary international law have
traditionally been the law of the sea, the laws of war, the law of recognition of a
nation, and the laws of diplomatic and consular immunity. The law of the sea
(including the apprehension of pirates) and the laws of war rely crucially upon
the practices adopted by a nation's navy and army, respectively.59 As commander
51
52

US Const, art I,
US Const, art I,

§ 8, cl 11.
§ 8, cl12.

55

US Const, art I, § 8, cl13.
US Const, art I, § 8, cl14.
US Const, art 11, §2,dl1.

56

US Const, art II,

57

Id.
US Const, art II,

53
54

58
59

§ 2, cl2.

§ 3.
See A. R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, eds, 73 InternationalLaw Studies: Annotated Supplement to
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 297 (Naval War College 1999) ("The
customary international law of armed conflict derives from the practice of military and naval
forces in the field, at sea, and in the air during hostilities."); James C. Duncan, A Primer on the
Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 Naval L Rev 1, 52 (1998) ("Although customary
international law may appear to remain constant, it does slowly change to incorporate new
battlefield practices of warring land, naval and air forces."). The United States employs its navy
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in chief, the president effectively controls national policies relating to these
standard objects of customary international law.
The law of recognition of a nation and the laws of diplomatic and consular
immunity depend upon the practice of a nation's diplomatic corps, an entity for
which the president possesses administrative responsibility.60 The recognition of
governments is considered an almost exclusively presidential function, both for
reasons of administrative practicality and because of the constitutional provision
stating that the president "shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers."'" Once officially received, such foreign diplomats are deemed the
authorized representatives of a recognized nation-state. Furthermore, the laws of
diplomatic and consular immunity, which govern how foreign nations treat
official US representatives abroad and how the United States treats official
representatives of other nations during their stay in the United States, are under
the nearly plenary authority of the Department of State. As with the president's
choice of a preratification pathway for treaties, the courts have not intervened
on Congress's behalf in any disputes between the legislature and the executive
over presidential authority.
III. IS CUSTOM OR TREATY A MORE PROMINENT INSTRUMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES?
The iterative perspective predicts that the executive (acting as an agent for
the entire nation and seeking efficient international cooperation) will use treaties
to pursue international cooperation, while the public choice perspective posits
that an influence-maximizing executive (guarding its own interests and especially
preserving its own freedom of action) will employ customary law. This Section
argues that empirical observation demonstrates the primacy of treaties as
instruments of international cooperation, thereby supporting the iterative
perspective over the public choice perspective.
A. TREATY AND CUSTOM
Any effort to determine whether custom or treaty is the primary
instrument of international cooperation for the United States entails
considerable subjectivity. Additionally, in the context of this particular inquiry,

60
61

to enforce Freedom of Navigation by sailing warships through areas where the United States
believes another state is making an excessive claim. See William J. Aceves, The Freedom of
Navigation Program:A Study of the Relationsbip between Law and Politics, 19 Hastings Ind & Comp L
Rev 259 (1996).
US Const, art II, 2, cl 2.
US Const, art II, § 3.
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the dichotomy between custom and treaty may not allow for an entirely precise
appraisal of the public choice perspective.
With regard to subjectivity, it bears note that no precise measure of
primacy can be readily employed. One could use a quantitative approach for
treaties by simply calculating how many of them exist. But a minor modification
to a status-of-forces agreement should ordinarily not receive the same weight as
NAFTA. Furthermore, even if one did count the number of treaties,
constructing a corresponding objective measure on the customary law side of
the balance would be untenable since customary rules are by their nature not
aggregated into discrete instruments. Alternatively, one could count the number
of rules contained in all treaties signed within a set period and then compare that
sum to the number of customary rules in force during that period. Even
ignoring practical problems, such as the time necessary to tally the rules in
thousands of current treaties, one would be hard pressed to find a suitable
means of counting customary legal rules. Such rules are formulated in a
decentralized fashion, with imprecise contours, and are thus not susceptible to
quantification. The effort to judge whether treaty or custom is the primary
instrument of international cooperation for the United States thus inherently
involves a substantial amount of subjectivity.
As to whether drawing the line precisely between custom and treaty is the
fairest test of the public choice perspective, the difficulty arises because
executive discretion is quite high in sole-executive agreements and much lower
in agreements involving congressional participation, even though both categories
involve treaties as the instrument in question. From the iterative perspective, the
important characteristics involve precision, formality of process at the
international level, centralization of the rules' reification, and so oncharacteristics with respect to which the divide between custom and treaty
accurately captures a break point in the relevant qualities. From the public
choice perspective, however, an influence-maximizing executive might classify
customary law and sole-executive agreements in one category while placing
agreements involving congressional participation in another. Customary law
features almost unfettered executive discretion while sole-executive agreements
allow the president to act without seeking support from another branch of
government. In contrast, agreements premised on unicameral or bicameral
congressional approval sharply circumscribe executive discretion. After
preliminarily accepting the custom/treaty divide, 1 therefore examine a
bifurcation between custom and sole-executive agreements, on the one hand,
and agreements with congressional approval, on the other.
If one considers the line between custom and treaty to be the relevant
division, then treaty law appears to be the predominant mode employed by the
United States to effect international policy. Tangible and controversial
manifestations (or causes) of globalization, like NAFTA and the agreements
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constituting the WTO, have been enshrined in the treaty form. The Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement preceding NAFTA was likewise a treaty.62 The General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, predating the WTO, were certainly written
instruments, even if their status as a binding treaty remained ambiguous until
their incorporation into the WTO's formal system. 63 Tax treaties and investment
treaties also contribute to international economic regulation.64 The regulation of
intellectual property, which constitutes a crucial component of globalized
businesses, occurs through a series of institutions and agreements embodied in
treaties. 65 Except for the treatment of expropriation in situations not covered by
treaty, few customary laws apply to national policies regarding economic
activities.
In the environmental realm, customary law governs monetary liability for
transboundary pollution and has resulted in virtually no cases.66 Treaty law
governs international whaling, the production and consumption of ozonedepleting substances, the discharge of oil into the ocean from vessels, and the
transportation of hazardous materials across international borders and on the

62

63

64

65

66

Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (Jan 2, 1988), 27 ILM 281; see also
North
American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America,
the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican States (Dec 17, 1992),
32 ILM 289 (1993).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Oct 30, 1947), 61
Stat All; see David Kennedy,
Receiving the International, 10 Conr J Ind L 1, 12 (1994) ("[W]hat has distinguished the
international trade regime is the vague, loose, open-textured nature of its legal regime. Maybe
the GATT is an international institution, maybe it is not; maybe the GATT is a binding treaty,
maybe not."). But see John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and EnvironmentalPolicies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 1227, 1269 (1992) ("Despite some occasional misguided or
misinformed statements to the contrary, the GATT is a binding treaty obligation accepted by
the nations which are Contracting Parties.").
See generally David B. Oliver, The DavidR. TillingbastLecture: Tax Treaties and the Market-State,
56
Tax L Rev 587 (2003); Bernard Kishoiyian, The Uility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formulation ofCustomagy InternationalLaw,14 NwJ Intl L & Bus 327 (1994).
See, for example, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (Apr 15,
1994), 1869 UNTS 299 (1995); Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris (July 24,
1971), 25 UST 1341 (1974); World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty (Dec
20, 1996), 36 ILM 65 (1997). For general reviews of international intellectual property law, see
Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking 29 Yale J Ind L 1 (2004); Marney L. Cheek, The Linits of Informal
Regulatoy Cooperationin InternationalAffairs: A Review of the Global IntellectualProperty Regime, 33 Geo
Wash Intl L Rev 277 (2001).
See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundagy Pollution, 46 Duke L J
931, 932-33 (1997)
("The customary international law of transboundary pollution ... is based on a very small
number of inconclusive adjudications and a mountain of official declarations and unofficial
commentary seeking to make something out of them.").
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high seas.67 These are intricate, repeatedly amended treaties that govern the
behavior of dozens and dozens of nations in the vast international commons.
A mix of customary law and treaty law applies in security matters. The law
of humanitarian intervention is driven by customary law, as no treaty exists to
guide a nation considering whether to send its armed forces to a turbulent
country to protect refugees, or to guard food shipments or humanitarian aid
workers.68 While the North Atlantic Treaty constituted the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO"),69 some of NATO's recent post-Cold War forays7 °
have contributed to evolving customs.7 The laws for conducting war were
customary for many centuries, but they are now embodied in the comprehensive
combinations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.72 The laws for justifying a
67

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Dec 2, 1946), 62 Stat 1716 (1948);

68

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Mar 22, 1985), 1513 UNTS 293
(1988); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Sept 16, 1987), 1522
UNTS 3 (1989); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
(May 12, 1954), 12 UST 2989 (1961); Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Mar 22, 1989), 28 ILM 649;
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (May 3, 1996), 35 ILM 1406.
See generally Leslie A. Burton, Kosovo: To Bomb or Not to Bomb? The Legality is the Quesion, 7 Ann
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Surv Ind & Comp L 49, 54-61 (2001); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary InternationalLaw
Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter,4 Cal W Intl L J 203,
258-59 (1974).
See, for example, North Atlantic Treaty (Apr 4, 1949), 63 Stat 2241; Agreement between the
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces (une 19, 1951), 4 UST
1792 (1953); Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey
(Oct 17, 1951), 3 UST 43 (1952); Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the
Federal Republic of Germany (Oct 23, 1954), 6 UST 5707 (1955). For a complete list of
protocols and amendments, see US Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and
Other InternationalAgreementsof the UnitedStates in Force on January 1, 2003 at 432 (2003).
NATO has intervened militarily in the past ten years in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the
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province of Kosovo in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland Modern Approaches to Customay InternationalLaw: A
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Reconciliation, 95 Am J Intl L 757, 785 (2001) ("The fluidity of custom is demonstrated by the
present debate over whether NATO's intervention in Kosovo has formed the basis for an
emerging customary right to unilateral humanitarian intervention."); see also Herman Reinhold,
Target Lists: A 1923 Idea with Applicationsfor the Future, 10 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L 1, 38 (2002)
("IT]he U.S. and NATO ... can build international law through practice and custom, while
encouraging others to adopt the same rules.... The U.S. and NATO are in the best position to
build positive custom in the international Law of War.").
For the Geneva Conventions, see Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Aug 12, 1949), 6 UST 3114 (1955);
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (Aug 12, 1949), 6 UST 3217 (1955); Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Aug 12, 1949), 6 UST 3316 (1955) ; Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Aug 12, 1949), 6 UST 3516 (1955).
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war were likewise customary but have to some extent been replaced by the
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 3
Arms control has proceeded through a multitude of intricate agreements.
Complex bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union have been transformed into
complex multilateral agreements. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty continues as a
focal point of debate in connection with the possibility of a National Missile
Defense system. 4 The international effort to prevent the spread of weapons of
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On the Hague Conventions, see Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the FinalFrontier The Law of
War in Space, 48 Air Force L Rev 1, 45 (2000) ("The conventions adopted in 1899 and 1907 at
the Hague provide, to this day, the backbone of international regulation governing the means
and methods of warfare."). The relevant Hague conventions are Convention (1) Regarding the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (July 29, 1899), 32 Stat 1779 (1901-03);
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (July 29, 1899), 32 Stat
1803 (1901-03); Convention (111) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of
the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864 (July 29, 1899), 32 Stat 1827 (1901-03); Declaration
Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases (July 29,
1899), 187 CTS 453; Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of Discharge of Projectiles from
Balloons (July 29, 1899), 32 Stat 1839 (1901-03); Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of the
Use of Expanding Bullets (July 29, 1899), 187 CTS 459; Convention (1) for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2199 (1909-11); Convention (JI)
Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts
(Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2241 (1909-11); Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities
(Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2259 (1909-11); Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2277 (1909-11); Convention (V) Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat
2310 (1909-11); Convention (VI) Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the
Outbreak of Hostilities (Oct 18, 1907), 205 CTS 305; Convention (VII) Relating to the
Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-ships (Oct 18, 1907), 205 CTS 319; Convention (VII1)
Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2332
(1909-11); Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War (Oct
18, 1907), 36 Stat 2351 (1909-11); Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of
the Principles of the Geneva Convention (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2371 (1909-11); Convention
(XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in
Naval War (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2396 (1909-11); Convention (XI1) Relative to the Creation
of an International Prize Court (Oct 18, 1907), 205 CTS 381; Convention (XII1) Concerning
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Oct 18, 1907), 36 Stat 2415 (1909-11);
and Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons
(18 October 1907), 36 Stat 2439 (1909-11).
Indicative of the ongoing balance between treaty law and customary
law is Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter, which explicitly and innovatively prohibits the use or threat of armed force against
another state, and Article 51, which preserves the "inherent" right of self-defense long
recognized in customary international law.
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (May 26, 1972), US-USSR, 23
UST
3435; see Robert F. Turner, NationalMissileDefense and the 1972 ABM Treaty, 36 New Eng L Rev
807 (2002).
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mass destruction depends in part upon the Chemical Weapons Convention, 5 77the
6
Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
With respect to human rights, most evidence points to custom as the
primary US instrument of international policy. Although the United States could
choose to be bound by the existing treaty law, a combination of presidential
reluctance and senatorial recalcitrance has assured that the United States is
bound to only a few multilateral human rights treaties. The US State
Department's listing of "Treaties in Force" for the United States shows the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the only multilateral
treaty in its "Human Rights" category. Customary law thus remains the primary
instrument of US policy in the human rights arena.
On balance, then, it would appear that treaty law is the primary instrument
of international policy for the United States in the realms of security, economics,
and the environment, while custom serves as the principal instrument in the
human rights realm. While these various categories might in some sense be
incommensurable, the overall picture demonstrates that treaty law dominates
international cooperative efforts in the United States.
B. CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL
NONPARTICIPATION
The picture is somewhat more complex if, in deference to the cleavage
implied by the analysis of an influence-maximizing executive, we place
customary law and sole-executive agreements together on one side of the
balance with Article II treaties on the other. The sole-executive agreement
accounts for a tremendous percentage of US treaties.7 9 Even in the form of
bilateral investment treaties or agreements reducing a variety of tariffs, they
provide the alert executive with the opportunity to bargain with concentrated
and wealthy interest groups. However, many of these agreements possess a
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Jan 13, 1993), 1974 UNTS 45 (1997). For a
summary of the chemical weapons regime, see Lilly R. Sucharipa-Behrmann and Thomas M.
Franck, Preventive Measures, 30 NYU J Ind L & Pol 485, 523-24 (1998).
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction (Apr 10, 1972), 26
UST 583 (1975).
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Treaties in Force:A List of Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements of the United States in Force on
Januagy 1, 2003 at 394 (cited in note 69).
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States' international agreements. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 106th
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highly limited scope, having been made pursuant to a narrow, statutory
delegation from Congress. This factor mitigates the degree to which an
influence-maximizing executive would consider such agreements to allow him
great discretion.8 ° Additionally, the politically high-profile agreements-NAFTA,
the WTO, the Kyoto Protocol-remain multilateral treaties that have been (or
would be) submitted to at least one chamber of Congress. On balance, I believe
(though with less certainty than was the case when custom versus treaty was the
dividing line) that those agreements involving congressional participation still
account for the lion's share of US policymaking in the international realm in
comparison to the legislature-free process occurring after the president
formulates a rule of customary international law or signs a sole-executive
agreement. In any case, I am confident that the continuing prevalence of
congressional consultation provides a puzzle that the influence-maximizing
model explains poorly.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined whether US behavior in the use of international
law is more consistent with an iterative or an influence-maximizing perspective
on national executive decision making. The paper has concluded that the
iterative perspective suggests the national executive will favor treaties over
custom as the preferred form for international cooperation, while the influencemaximizing perspective suggests a preference for custom-and that the
evidence, at least for the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century,
is more consistent with the predictions of the iterative perspective. Avenues of
further inquiry might include a comparative analysis of the incentives facing
executives in other nation-states, as well as an analysis of other factors that
might enter into a treaty-versus-custom choice.
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Such a statement assumes that Congress is inclined to become aware of the situation and
accordingly to withdraw the delegated authority.
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